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New Results on the Existence of Open Loop Nash
Equilibria in Discrete Time Dynamic Games
Mathew P. Abraham and Ankur A. Kulkarni
Abstract—We address the problem of finding conditions which
guarantee the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria in discrete
time dynamic games (DTDGs). The classical approach to DTDGs
involves analyzing the problem using optimal control theory
which yields results mainly limited to linear-quadratic games
[1]. We show the existence of equilibria for a class of DTDGs
where the cost function of players admits a quasi-potential
function which leads to new results and, in some cases, a
generalization of similar results from linear-quadratic games.
Our results are obtained by introducing a new formulation
for analysing DTDGs using the concept of a conjectured state
by the players. In this formulation, the state of the game is
modelled as dependent on players. Using this formulation we
show that there is an optimisation problem such that the solution
of this problem gives an equilibrium of the DTDG. To extend
the result for more general games, we modify the DTDG with
an additional constraint of consistency of the conjectured state.
Any equilibrium of the original game is also an equilibrium of
this modified game with consistent conjectures. In the modified
game, we show the existence of equilibria for DTDGs where
the cost function of players admits a potential function. We end
with conditions under which an equilibrium of the game with
consistent conjectures is an ǫ-Nash equilibria of the original game.
Index Terms—Discrete time dynamic games, Open-loop Nash
equilibrium, Potential games, Quasi-potential games, Shared
constraint games, Consistent state conjectures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many scenarios which involve more than one player with
decisions to be made over finitely many stages can be modelled
as Discrete Time Dynamic Games (DTDGs). In a DTDG, at
each stage of the game, each player makes decisions which
optimise his cost function. A set of variables called the state of
the game evolves according to the state equation depending on
the decision of players at each stage. Many situations in power
markets, robotics, network security, environmental economics,
natural resource economics, industrial organisation and so on
are known to come under the framework of DTDGs [2], [3],
[4].
The information structure of the dynamic game declares
what each player knows while making the decision. A com-
monly used information structure is the open-loop information
structure in which the players only have the information of the
initial state of the game while making the decisions. This paper
derives new results on the existence of Nash equilibria under
the assumption of an open-loop information structure. The
resulting equilibria are termed as open-loop Nash equilibria.
An open-loop Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies
for which the players do not have any incentive for unilateral
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deviation. Guaranteeing the existence of an equilibrium has
been a primary challenge in the theory of DTDGs. In general,
the approach of analysing DTDGs consists of viewing each
players’ problem as an optimal control problem and using
the results from optimal control theory [1]. But the results
that provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium are mostly confined to linear-quadratic DTDGs
[5], [6], [7]. In this paper, we introduce a new approach of
analysing DTDGs which leads to new results on the existence
of open-loop Nash equilibria. Furthermore, in some cases, our
result generalize earlier results from linear-quadratic games.
A key step in our approach is the introduction of the
concept of a conjectured state by players for DTDGs. This
allows us to model the state of the game as dependent on
players. This leads to a new formulation of DTDGs with
the conjectured state also considered as a decision variable.
In the new formulation, we define a class of games called
quasi-potential DTDGs. In quasi-potential DTDGs, the cost
function of players has a special structure. One part of the
cost function admits a potential function and another part is
identical for all players. Our first result gives conditions for
the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria for quasi-potential
DTDGs. The result is obtained by relating an equilibrium of
a quasi-potential DTDG to the solution of an optimisation
problem.
Following this, we modify the DTDG by introducing an
additional constraint of consistency of the conjectured states1,
which can be deciphered as follows. A player in this game
is constrained to conjecture the state of the game consistently
with the conjectures of other players. We will refer to this
game as a DTDG with consistent conjectures. The equilibrium
that we obtain from the DTDG with consistent conjectures is
a weaker notion of the equilibrium of the original game. That
is, an equilibrium of the original game is also an equilibrium
of the game with consistent conjectures, however, the reverse
may not be true. The DTDG with consistent conjectures has a
shared constraint structure unlike the original game. Utilising
the shared constraint structure, we show the existence of
equilibria for DTDGs with consistent conjectures under the
assumption that the cost function of the players admits a
potential function [9]. We end with a result that provides
sufficient conditions for an equilibrium of the game with
consistent conjectures to be an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the
original game.
In addition to deriving new results on the existence of open-
loop Nash equilibria, this approach has other advantages also.
1The notion of consistent conjecture used here is different from the one
used by Marie and Tidball in [8]
2For example, the formulation with the conjectured state allows
one to consider constraints on actions and states in a game.
Also, the weaker notion of Nash equilibrium for the game
with consistent conjectures can be used as a design tool since
there can be some additional equilibrium points in the modified
game compared to the original one.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next sec-
tion provides necessary preliminaries and background for the
paper. Section III details the new formulation of DTDGs with
the conjectured state as decision variable and its equivalence
to the classical formulation. Section IV defines quasi-potential
DTDGs and conditions for existence of an equilibrium in such
games. The case of DTDGs with stage-additive cost function
is also considered for quasi-potential DTDGs in this section.
Section V describes the DTDG with consistency condition, the
shared constraint structure of this game and the existence of
an equilibrium in this game with the cost of players having a
potential function. This section also provides a condition for
an equilibrium of the DTDG with consistent conjectures to be
an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original problem. The paper ends
with a conclusion in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES & BACKGROUND
Before discussing the main contents of the paper, in this
section, we mention some necessary definitions and results
which are related to our work. The definition of DTDGs and
the open-loop Nash equilibria in DTDGs [1] are presented
initially. This will also introduce the notation that we use
throughout this paper.
Definition 2.1: A DTDG with open-loop information struc-
ture consists of the following.
1) An index set, N = {1, 2, . . . , N} called the players set,
where N denote the number of players.
2) An index set, K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} called the stage set of
the game, where K is the maximum number of actions
a player can make in a game.
3) A set U ik, ∀i ∈ N and ∀k ∈ K called the action / control
set to which the action of player i at stage k belongs. The
Cartesian set, U i , U i1×U i2×· · ·×U iK is the action set
of player i and U , U1×· · ·×UN is the action set of the
game. The action set of adversaries of player i at stage
k and for the game is defined as U−ik ,
∏
j∈N\{i} U
j
k
and U−i , U−i1 × U
−i
2 × · · · × U
−i
K respectively.
4) A set Xk, ∀k ∈ K∪{K+1} called the state space of the
game at stage k to which the state of the game belongs.
Since we are considering the open-loop information
structure, the initial state of the game is assumed to be
known to all players and is denoted by x1 ∈ X1.
5) A mapping fk : Xk × U1k × U2k × · · · × UNk −→ Xk+1
is defined for each k ∈ K such that
xk+1 = fk(xk, u
1
k, u
2
k, . . . , u
N
k ) (1)
is the state equation of the DTDG, where u1k ∈ U1k , u2k ∈
U2k , . . . , u
N
k ∈ U
N
k are the actions of the players at stage
k and xk ∈ Xk is the state at stage k.
6) A class of mappings denoted by Γik, i ∈ N , k ∈ K
called the strategy set of player i at stage k. A mapping
γik ∈ Γ
i
k, given by γik : X1 → U ik is the strategy
of player i at stage k. The aggregate mapping γi =
{γi1, γ
i
2, . . . , γ
i
K} ∈ Γ
i =
K∏
k=1
Γik is the strategy of player
i in the game.
7) A function J i : U ×X2× · · ·×XK+1 −→ R is defined
for each i ∈ N called the cost function of Player i in
the game of K stages.
For each fixed initial state x1 and for fixed N -tuple of
permissible strategies {γi ∈ Γi; i ∈ N}, there exist a
unique set of vectors {uik ≡ γik(x1); i ∈ N , k ∈ K}
and the state evolves according to the state equation (1).
Substitution of these quantities into J i, i ∈ N leads to a
unique N -tuple of numbers reflecting corresponding costs to
the players. This implies the existence of Li : Γ1 × Γ2 ×
· · · × ΓN −→ R, the cost function in the strategy space.
That is Li(γ1, . . . , γN) ≡ J i(u1, . . . , uN , x1, x2, . . . , xK+1),
where γi = {γi1, γi2, . . . , γiK} ∈ Γi; i ∈ N and ui =
(ui1, u
i
2, . . . , u
i
K) ∈ U
i; i ∈ N and each uik = γik(x1) and
xk+1 = fk(xk, u
1
k, u
2
k, . . . , u
N
k ), k ∈ K.
In a DTDG with open-loop information structure, a player’s
problem is to decide his strategies γi ∈ Γi which minimises
his cost function Li. Often the cost function is expressed as a
stage-wise additive function which is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2: In an N -person DTDG of K-stages, player
i’s cost function is said to be stage-additive if there exist
functions gik : Xk+1 × U1k × · · · × UNk × Xk → R, ∀k ∈ K
such that,
J i(u1, . . . , uN , x1, . . . , xK+1) =
K∑
k=1
gik(xk+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , xk),
where ui = (ui1, . . . , uiK) ∈ U i, ∀i ∈ N and xk ∈ Xk, ∀k ∈
K ∪ {K + 1}.
We define the open-loop Nash equilibrium in a DTDG as
follows [1].
Definition 2.3: An N -tuple of strategies {γi∗ ∈ Γi; i ∈ N}
constitute an open-loop Nash equilibrium if and only if the
following inequalities are satisfied ∀i ∈ N .
Li(γ1∗, γ2∗, . . . , γi∗, . . . , γN∗) ≤ Li(γ1∗, . . . , γ(i−1)∗,
γi, γ(i+1)∗, . . . , γN∗), ∀γi ∈ Γi.
Let {ui∗ ∈ U i; i ∈ N} be the actions of players correspond-
ing to the equilibrium strategies (γ1∗, γ2∗, . . . , γN∗). Unlike
other information structures, in the open-loop information
structure, the strategy γik ∈ Γik, i ∈ N , k ∈ K is a constant
function of x1. Hence we can write that the N -tuple of actions
{ui∗ ∈ U i; i ∈ N} corresponding to the equilibrium strategies
constitute an open-loop Nash equilibrium if and only if the
following inequalities are satisfied ∀i ∈ N .
J i(u1∗, . . . , ui∗, . . . , uN∗, x1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
K+1) ≤ J
i(u1∗, . . . ,
u(i−1)∗, ui, u(i+1)∗, . . . , uN∗, x1, x2, . . . , xK+1), ∀u
i ∈ U i,
where x∗k+1 = fk(x∗k, u1∗k , u2∗k , . . . , uN∗k ), k ∈ K and xk+1 =
fk(xk, u
1∗
k , . . . , u
(i−1)∗
k , u
i
k, u
(i+1)∗
k , . . . , u
N∗
k ), k ∈ K.
A commonly used line of analysis for DTDGs is given
as follows. A necessary condition for the existence of an
3open-loop Nash equilibrium based on Pontryagin’s principle
can be derived as in Bas¸ar and Olsder [1]. A sufficient
condition for linear-quadratic DTDGs can also be obtained by
solving a recursive Riccati equation. Under some additional
assumptions, it is shown in [6] that the two-point boundary
value problem is uniquely solvable for a linear-quadratic case.
A recent paper [7] by Reddy and Zaccour considers a class
of linear-quadratic DTDGs with linear constraints on control
and state. Another potential line of analysis is as follows.
Since an open-loop Nash equilibrium is equivalently given by
a sequence of actions ui∗ ∈ U i, i ∈ N (rather than strategies
γi∗ ∈ Γi, i ∈ N ), the open-loop Nash equilibrium is also the
equilibrium of a static game obtained by substituting the state
equation (1) into the cost function of each player. Evidently,
this line of analysis succeeds only if the cost function and
the dynamics take simple forms. In this paper, we introduce a
different approach by reformulating DTDGs with the concept
of a conjectured state as shown in the next section.
III. REFORMULATION OF DTDGS
An important step in deriving the new results on the
existence of equilibria is the reformulation of DTDGs with
the notion of the conjectured state. In the classical definition
of DTDGs, the state of the game is defined as independent
of players and it evolves “in the background” according to
the state equation depending on the actions of players. For a
player, a conceivable manner of playing in a DTDG is to make
an independent conjecture about the state trajectory. Motivated
by this, we model the state of the game as dependent on
players. We will refer to this new formulation as state conjec-
ture formulation. The new formulation has the advantage of
easier analysis than the classical formulation. Furthermore, in
this section, we show the equivalence of the state conjecture
formulation to the classical one. A notion of conjecture is also
used in [8]. But the conjecture used there is about the rivals
actions using the state or control information which is different
from our notion of the state conjecture.
In the state conjecture formulation, the state space of player
i at stage k is defined as set X ik+1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K. In order
to make the new formulation consistent with the original, the
state space is defined such that X ik+1 ≡ Xk+1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈
K. The state space of player i over stages is given by X i ,
K+1∏
k=2
X ik and the state space of the game as X ,
N∏
i=1
X i. We
define the state space of adversaries of player i at stage k as
X−ik ,
∏
j∈N\{i}X
j
k and the state space of adversaries of
player i for the game as X−i ,
K+1∏
k=2
X−ik . The dependence of
the state space on players leads to respective changes in the
state equation, the strategies and the cost function. The state
mapping fk : X ik ×U1k ×U2k × ...×UNk −→ X ik+1 is defined
for each k ∈ K so that,
xik+1 = fk(x
i
k, u
1
k, u
2
k, . . . , u
N
k ) (2)
is the state equation of the DTDG in state conjecture formu-
lation. The permissible strategies in new formulation become
γik : X1 → U
i
k, i ∈ N , k ∈ K and the cost function of player i
is a mapping given by J i : U ×X1×X i2×· · ·×X iK+1 −→ R
which is defined for each i ∈ N .
1) Player i’s problem: Consider a player’s problem in the
state conjecture formulation of a DTDG. Let i ∈ N be a player
in the game. Given the rivals actions u−i = (u−i1 , . . . , u−iK ) ∈
U−i and the initial state x1, the player i’s problem is denoted
by Pi(u−i;x1) and is given by the following optimisation
problem.
Pi(u
−i;x1) min
ui,xi
J i(ui, xi;u−i, x1)
s.t. (ui, xi) ∈ Ωi(u−i;x1),
where,
Ωi(u
−i;x1) = {uˆ
i
1, . . . , uˆ
i
K , xˆ
i
2, . . . xˆ
i
K+1|uˆ
i
k ∈ U
i
k, ∀k ∈ K,
xˆik+1 ∈ X
i
k+1, ∀k ∈ K, xˆ
i
2 = f1(x1, uˆ
i
1, u
−i
1 ),
xˆik+1 = fk(xˆ
i
k, uˆ
i
k, u
−i
k ), ∀k ∈ K\{1}}.
Since the state trajectory of the game xi = (xi2, . . . , xiK+1) ∈
X i is dependent on players, it is also considered as a decision
variable as opposed to the classical formulation. Define the
Cartesian product of the feasible set Ωi(u−i;x1) as Ω(u, x) ,∏
i∈N Ωi(u
−i;x1), where u = (u1, u2, . . . , uN ) ∈ U and
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) ∈ X . The fixed points of the set
value map Ω(u, x) is denoted by F which is given by
F , {(u, x)|(u, x) ∈ Ω(u, x)}. We can write the set F in
the expanded form as follows.
F = {(u, x)|u ∈ U, xi ∈ X i, ∀i ∈ N , xi2 = f1(x1, u
1
1, . . . , u
N
1 ),
∀i ∈ N , xik+1 = fk(x
i
k, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k ), ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K}.
Notice that the initial state x1 is a parameter on which the set
F depends. So in the set F , for a fixed x1, the state trajectories
of players are consistent, i.e., for all i ∈ N , xi = xj , ∀j ∈
N\{i}. Using the state conjecture formulation of DTDG, we
redefine the open-loop Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition 3.1: A tuple of strategies {(ui∗, xi∗); i ∈ N} ∈
F is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of DTDG if ∀i ∈ N ,
given u−i∗ ∈ U−i,
J i(ui∗, xi∗;u−i∗, x1) ≤ J
i(ui, xi;u−i∗, x1),
∀(ui, xi) ∈ Ωi(u
−i∗;x1).
2) Equivalence to the classical formulation: The equiva-
lence of the classical and the state conjecture formulation
in terms of the open-loop Nash equilibria is given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: Consider a DTDG as defined in Definition
2.1. Suppose the state space is equivalent in the state con-
jecture and the classical formulations (X ik+1 ≡ Xk+1, ∀i ∈
N , k ∈ K). For a given initial state x1 ∈ X1, then (u∗, x∗) ∈
F is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of a DTDG in the state
conjecture formulation if and only if u∗ ∈ U is an open-loop
Nash equilibrium in the classical formulation with the state
trajectory at equilibrium given by any component xi∗ ∈ X i
of x∗.
Proof: Let (u∗, x∗) ∈ F be an equilibrium of DTDG in
state conjecture formulation. Consider the problem of player i
in state conjecture formulation given by Pi(u−i∗;x1), where
4u−i∗ is the equilibrium actions of other players and x1, the
initial state. The player i’s problem in the state conjecture
formulation with state expanded over stages is denoted by
problem Pi(u−i∗;x1) which is given as follows.
Pi(u−i∗;x1) min
ui,xi
J i(ui, xi2, . . . , x
i
K+1;u
−i∗, x1)
s.t. (ui, xi2, . . . , x
i
K+1) ∈ Ωi(u
−i∗;x1).
By substituting the state equation (2) for the states in the cost
function from the feasible set, we redefine the problem in
action space as given below.
min
ui,xi
J i(ui, f1(x1, u
i
1, u
−i∗
1 ), . . . ;u
−i∗, x1)
s.t. uik ∈ U
i
k, ∀k ∈ K.
This is indeed the classical DTDG problem of player i in the
action space. Hence, any equilibrium in the state conjecture
formulation is an equilibrium in the classical formulation.
Conversely, for any equilibrium in the space of actions,
player i’s problem can be written as Pi(u−i∗;x1) and hence
an equilibrium in the state conjecture formulation. Hence
(u∗, x∗) ∈ F is an equilibrium in state conjecture formulation
if and only if u∗ ∈ U is an equilibrium in the original
formulation.
Thus, we have a new formulation equivalent to the classical
one. We will exploit this new formulation to derive our
existence results.
IV. QUASI-POTENTIAL DTDG
Our first result on the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria
for DTDGs is presented in this section. The result provides
conditions for the existence of equilibria for a class of games
called quasi-potential DTDGs. The idea is to split the cost
function of players into two parts, one part that admits a
potential function and another part which is identical for all
players. A quasi-potential game is a special case of a potential
game [9], introduced by Kulkarni et. al. in [10] for multi-leader
multi-follower games. Here, we extend the concept of quasi-
potential to DTDGs. The definition of quasi-potential DTDGs
is given as follows.
Definition 4.1: Consider a DTDG defined in state conjec-
ture formulation with the cost function of players given by
{J1, J2, . . . , JN}. The DTDG is said to be quasi-potential if
the cost function of players admits a quasi-potential function
for which the following has to hold.
1) There exist functions Φ1,Φ2, . . . ,ΦN and h such that
for all i ∈ N , player i’s cost function can be written as
J i(u, x1, x
i) ≡ Φi(u, x1) + h(u, x1, xi), ∀u ∈ U, ∀xi ∈
X i,
2) and there exist a function π such that for all
i ∈ N and for all u−i ∈ U−i, we have
Φi(u˜
i;u−i, x1) − Φi(uˆ
i;u−i, x1) = π(u˜
i;u−i, x1) −
π(uˆi;u−i, x1), ∀u˜i, uˆi ∈ U i.
The function π + h is termed as a quasi-potential function
of the quasi-potential DTDG. Note that the function h is
independent of players, but the argument of the function
is dependent on players. We utilize this structure of quasi-
potential DTDGs to provide the existence of equilibria in such
games.
A. Existence of equilibria in quasi-potential DTDGs
We need to establish a lemma in order to prove the existence
of open-loop Nash equilibria in quasi-potential DTDGs. For
that, consider a set Fq defined as follows.
Fq , {(u11:K , . . . , u
N
1:K , w2, w3, . . . , wK , wK+1)|u
1
1:K , . . . ,
uN1:K ∈ U,wk+1 ∈ Xk+1, ∀k ∈ K, w2 = f1(x1, u
1
1, . . . , u
N
1 ),
wk+1 = fk(wk, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k ), ∀k ∈ K\{1}}.
Note that the initial state x1 is a parameter on which the set
Fq depends. Now we consider the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1: Consider a DTDG with initial state x1.
For some i ∈ N , given u−i ∈ U−i, a point
(ui, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) is feasible for the problem given by
Pi(u
−i;x1) if and only if (u,w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Fq . That
means,
(ui, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Ωi(u
−i;x1) ⇐⇒
(u,w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ F
q.
Proof: “⇒” For given u−i ∈ U−i and initial state
x1, consider a point (ui, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Ωi(u−i;x1).
That means, ui ∈ U i, w2 = f1(x1, ui1, u−i1 ), wk+1 =
fk(wk, u
i
k, u
−i
k ), ∀k ∈ K\{1}. Now by combining ui ∈ U i
and u−i ∈ U−i we can rewrite the above equations as
u ∈ U,w2 = f1(x1, ui1, u
−i
1 ), wk+1 = fk(wk, u
i
k, u
−i
k ), ∀k ∈
K\{1}. Hence, (u,w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Fq.
“⇐” Suppose (u,w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Fq . Hence, u ∈
U,w2 = f1(x1, u
i
1, u
−i
1 ), wk+1 = fk(wk, u
i
k, u
−i
k ), ∀k ∈
K\{1}. For some i ∈ N , we separate the actions of player i
and adversaries as ui ∈ U i and u−i ∈ U−i. For some fixed
u−i ∈ U−i and x1, the equations can be rewritten as ui ∈
U i, w2 = f1(x1, u
i
1, u
−i
1 ), wk+1 = fk(wk, u
i
k, u
−i
k ), ∀k ∈
K\{1}. Hence, (ui, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Ωi(u−i;x1).
For a quasi-potential DTDG with quasi-potential function
π + h, consider an optimisation problem denoted by Pq .
Pq min
(u,w2,...,wK+1)
π(u, x1) + h(u, x1, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1)
s.t. (u,w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Fq
Note that the objective function of the problem Pq is the quasi-
potential function π + h and the feasible set is Fq . We relate
the solution of Pq to an equilibrium of a quasi-potential DTDG
which is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1: Consider a quasi-potential DTDG with a
quasi-potential function π + h. Consider the optimisation
problem given by Pq for the quasi-potential DTDG. If
(u,w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Fq is a global minimizer of the
problem Pq , then (u, x) ∈ F is an open-loop Nash equilibrium
of the quasi-potential DTDG with xik+1 = wk+1, ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈
N .
Proof: Let (u,w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Fq be the minimizer
of the problem Pq . Then,
π(u, x1) + h(u, x1, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ≤ π(u˜), x1 + h(u˜, x1,
w˜2, . . . , w˜K+1), ∀(u˜, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1) ∈ F
q.
5By splitting the actions u, u˜ ∈ U over player i as u = (ui, u−i)
and u˜ = (u˜i, u˜−i) respectively, we can rewrite as,
π(ui, u−i, x1) + h(u
i, u−i, x1, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ≤
π(u˜i, u˜−i, x1) + h(u˜
i, x1, u˜
−i, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1),
∀(u˜i, u˜−i, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1) ∈ F
q.
The inequality still holds even if we replace u˜−i ∈ U−i by
u−i ∈ U−i. Hence, the above inequality can be rewritten as,
π(ui, u−i, x1) + h(u
i, u−i, x1, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ≤
π(u˜i, u−i, x1) + h(u˜
i, u−i, , x1w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1),
∀(u˜i, u−i, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1) ∈ F
q.
Using Lemma 4.1, the above inequality can be rewritten as,
π(ui, u−i, x1) + h(u
i, u−i, x1, w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ≤
π(u˜i, u−i, x1) + h(u˜
i, u−i, x1, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1),
∀(u˜i, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1) ∈ Ωi(u
−i;x1), ∀i ∈ N .
Since the game is a quasi-potential DTDG and
(w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) = x
i ∈ X i, ∀i ∈ N ,
Φi(u
i, u−i, x1) + h(u
i, u−i, x1, x
i) ≤
Φi(u˜
i, u−i, x1) + h(u˜
i, u−i, x1, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1),
∀(u˜i, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1) ∈ Ωi(u
−i;x1), ∀i ∈ N .
Hence, ∀i ∈ N ,
J i(u, xi, x1) ≤ J
i(u˜i, x1, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1;u
−i),
∀(u˜i, w˜2, w˜3, . . . , w˜K+1) ∈ Ωi(u
−i;x1).
Thus, if the optimisation problem Pq has a minimizer then
there exists an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the quasi-
potential DTDG. The following results gives conditions which
guarantee the existence of a minimum for the problem Pq .
Corollary 4.2: A quasi-potential DTDG admits an open-
loop Nash equilibrium if the quasi-potential function, π + h
is continuous and the set Fq is non empty and compact. The
set Fq is compact if the sets U,X are compact and fk is
continuous for all k ∈ K.
Corollary 4.2 can be easily proved using Weierstrass Theo-
rem. But the requirement of compactness of state space in
Corollary 4.2 may be restrictive in some cases. The following
result gives the existence of equilibria without the condition
of compactness of state or action spaces, instead imposing
the condition of coercivity of quasi-potential function. The
coercivity definition is given as follows.
Definition 4.2: A quasi-potential function π + h is coercive
if
lim inf
||u,w2,...,wK+1||→∞
(u,w2,...,wK+1)∈Fq
π(u, x1) + h(u, x1, w2, . . . , wK+1) =∞.
Corollary 4.3: A quasi-potential DTDG admits an open-
loop Nash equilibrium if the quasi-potential function, π + h is
continuous and coercive and fk is continuous for each k ∈ K.
Since the state conjecture formulation is equivalent to the
original formulation, an equilibrium of a DTDG in this new
formulation with cost function of players admitting a quasi-
potential function is indeed an equilibrium in the original
formulation.
B. Stage-additive quasi-potential DTDG
Now we consider the case of stage-additive DTDG as
defined in Definition 2.2. For such games the stage-wise cost
functions g1k, g2k, . . . , gNk admits a quasi-potential function if
the following conditions are satisfied for each k ∈ K.
1) There exist functions Ψ1k,Ψ2k, . . . ,ΨNk and hk such that
∀i ∈ N , gik is given by,
gik(x
i
k+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , x
i
k) ≡ Ψ
i
k(u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k ) + hk(x
i
k,
u1k, . . . , u
N
k , x
i
k+1), ∀u
i
k ∈ U
i
k, ∀x
i
k+1 ∈ X
i
k+1, ∀k ∈ K,
2) and there exist functions πk, ∀k ∈ K such that for all
i ∈ N and for all u−ik ∈ U
−i
k ,
Ψik(u˜
i
k, u
−i
k )−Ψ
i
k(uˆ
i
k, u
−i
k ) = πk(u˜
i
k, u
−i
k )−
πk(uˆ
i
k, u
−i
k ), ∀u˜
i
k, uˆ
i
k ∈ U
i
k.
The function πk + hk is a stage-wise quasi-potential func-
tion for the stage-wise quasi-potential DTDG. The following
proposition shows that if the stage-wise cost function of
players admit a stage-wise quasi-potential function, then the
overall cost functions also admit a quasi-potential function.
Proposition 4.4: Consider a stage-additive DTDG defined
in Definition 2.2. If the stage-wise cost functions gik, i ∈ N
admit a stage-wise quasi-potential function, then the stage-
additive cost functions J1, J2, . . . , JN also admit a quasi-
potential function.
Proof: The stage-additive cost function of player i in a
stage-wise quasi-potential DTDG is given by,
J i(u1, u2, . . . , uN , x1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
K+1) =
K∑
k=1
Ψik(u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k ) +
K∑
k=1
hk(x
i
k, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , x
i
k+1),
where uik ∈ U ik, ui ∈ U i, xik+1 ∈ X ik+1, ∀i ∈ N . The first
sum admits a potential function given by
K∑
k=1
πk . The second
sum is independent of players though the argument depends
on. Hence, the stage-additive cost function of players admit a
quasi-potential function.
For a stage-wise quasi-potential DTDG with stage-wise
quasi-potential function πk + hk, consider the following opti-
misation problem denoted by P sq with w1 = x1.
P sq min
(u,w2,...,wK+1)
K∑
k=1
[
πk(u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k ) + hk(u,wk, wk+1)
]
s.t. (u,w2, w3, . . . , wK+1) ∈ Fq.
It can be seen from Theorem 4.1 that the minimizer of the
problem P sq is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the stage-
wise quasi-potential DTDG with xik+1 = wk+1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈
K. The problem P sq has the structure of a standard control
problem for which a vast theory is available which can be
utilized to determine the equilibria.
6It can be seen that the linear-quadratic DTDGs under
certain assumptions comes under the class of stage-wise quasi-
potential DTDGs. We first provide the definition of linear-
quadratic DTDGs.
Definition 4.3: An N -person DTDG is of linear-quadratic
type if U ik = Rmi (i ∈ N , k ∈ K), and
fk(x
i
k, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k ) = Akx
i
k +
∑
j∈N
b
j
ku
j
k,
gik(x
i
k+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , x
i
k) =
1
2
(
xi
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i
k+1+∑
j∈N
u
j′
k R
ij
k u
j
k
)
,
where Ak, Bk, Qik, R
ij
k are matrices of appropriate dimen-
sions, Qik+1 is symmetric, Riik ≻ 0 and uik ∈ U ik, xik+1 ∈
X ik+1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K.
Lemma 4.2: For a linear-quadratic DTDG with Qk+1 ,
Qik+1 = Q
j
k+1, ∀i, j ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K, the stage-wise cost
function of players, gik admit a quasi-potential function.
Proof: For a linear-quadratic DTDG, the stage-wise cost
function is given by,
gik(x
i
k+1, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k , x
i
k) =
1
2
(
xi
′
k+1Qk+1x
i
k+1+∑
j∈N
u
j′
k R
ij
k u
j
k
)
.
It can be easily verified that the second summation term
is a quadratic function which admits a potential func-
tion with stage-wise potential function πk(u1k, . . . , uNk ) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
ui
′
kR
ii
k u
i
k. Hence, in the definition of quasi-potential
DTDG, Ψik = 12
∑
j∈N
u
j′
k R
ij
k u
j
k. Also, the first function is
identical for all players and the argument depends on the state
conjectured by players. Hence, hk = 12xi
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i
k+1, which
implies that gik admits a quasi-potential function.
The fact that the stage-wise cost function of the linear-
quadratic DTDGs under certain assumptions admit a stage-
wise quasi-potential function can be utilized to provide the
existence of equilibria in such cases which are given by the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.5: Consider a linear-quadratic DTDG as de-
fined in 4.3. Suppose the assumptions of Lemma 4.2 hold
with Qk+1 ≻ 0, ∀k ∈ K. Then there exists an equilibrium for
the linear-quadratic DTDG which is given by the minimizer
of the problem P sq .
Proof: Since Qk+1 ≻ 0, ∀k ∈ K and Riik ≻ 0, ∀i ∈
N , ∀k ∈ K, the quasi-potential function
∑
k∈K
(πk + hk) as
defined in the proof of Lemma 4.2 for the linear-quadratic
DTDG is coercive. Then the result follows directly from
Corollary 4.3.
Thus, using the state conjecture formulation, the existence
of open-loop Nash equilibria can be guaranteed for games
with cost function of players admitting quasi-potential function
which also includes a class linear-quadratic DTDGs. In the
next section, we introduce some additional constraints on the
state conjecture formulation which can provide new existence
results for DTDGs.
V. DTDG WITH CONSISTENT CONJECTURES
In the state conjecture formulation of DTDGs, each player
conjectures the state of the game independently. In this sec-
tion, we modify the DTDG with an additional constraint of
consistency of the conjectured states. This constraint requires
that each player conjecture the state of the game consistently
with other players. We will refer to this game as a DTDG
with consistent conjectures. Even though the DTDG with
consistent conjectures is different from the original DTDG,
an equilibrium of the original game is also an equilibrium
of the game with consistent conjectures. The DTDG with
consistent conjectures has a special structure called shared
constraint structure which the original game does not have.
We utilize this structure for giving conditions for the existence
of equilibria for DTDGs when the cost functions of players
admit a potential function. In this section, we also discuss
conditions under which an equilibrium of the DTDG with
consistent conjectures is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original
game.
A player’s problem in the game with consistent conjectures
is given in the following section.
1) Player i’s problem in the DTDG with consistent con-
jectures: Let i ∈ N be an arbitrary player in a DTDG with
consistent conjectures. Given u−i = (u−i1 , . . . , u−iK ) ∈ U−i,
the actions of other players, x−i = (x−i2 , . . . , x
−i
K+1) ∈ X
−i
,
the state conjectures of other players and x1, the initial state
of the game, player i’s problem in this game is denoted by
P
′
i (u
−i, x−i;x1) which is given by the following.
P
′
i (u
−i, x−i;x1) min
ui,xi
J i(ui, xi;u−i, x1)
s.t. (ui, xi) ∈ Ω
′
i(u
−i, x−i;x1),
where,
Ω
′
i(u
−i, x−i;x1) = {(uˆ
i, xˆi)|uˆik ∈ U
i
k, ∀k ∈ K, xˆ
i
k+1 ∈ X
i
k+1,
∀k ∈ K, xˆi2 = f1(x1, uˆ
i
1, u
−i
1 ), xˆ
i
k+1 = fk(xˆ
i
k, uˆ
i
k, u
−i
k ),
∀k ∈ K\{1}, xˆik+1 = x
j
k+1, ∀j ∈ N\{i}, ∀k ∈ K}.
The Cartesian product of the feasible set Ω′i(u−i, x−i;x1) over
i ∈ N is given by the set value map denoted by Ω′(u, x) which
is given by, Ω′(u, x) ,
∏
i∈N
Ω
′
i(u
−i, x−i;x1), where u ∈ U
and x ∈ X . The fixed points of the set value map Ω′(u, x)
is denoted as F ′ and is given by, F ′ , {(u, x)|(u, x) ∈
Ω′(u, x)}. It can be given by,
F
′
= {(u, x)|u ∈ U, x ∈ X, xi2 = f1(x1, u
1
1, . . . , u
N
1 ), ∀i ∈ N ,
xik+1 = fk(x
i
k, u
1
k, . . . , u
N
k ), ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K,
xik+1 = x
j
k+1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀j ∈ N\{i}, ∀k ∈ K}. (3)
Notice that since the consistency condition is redundant in the
set F
′
, the set F ′ is same as F . That is,
F
′
= F .
7The definition of open-loop Nash equilibrium for a DTDG
with consistent conjectures is given as follows.
Definition 5.1: Consider a DTDG with consistent conjec-
tures with the initial state x1. A point {(ui∗, xi∗); i ∈ N} ∈ F ′
is said to be an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the DTDG with
consistent conjectures if ∀i ∈ N , given (u−i∗, x−i∗) ∈ U−i×
X−i, the actions and state conjectures at the equilibrium,
J i(ui∗, xi∗;u−i∗, x1) ≤ J
i(ui, xi;u−i∗, x1),
∀(ui, xi) ∈ Ω
′
i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1).
2) Relation to equilibria of the original game: The relation
of equilibria of the original game to equilibria of the game with
consistent conjectures is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1: Consider a DTDG in state conjecture
formulation. If (u1∗, . . . , uN∗, x1∗, . . . , xN∗) ∈ F is an
open-loop Nash equilibrium of the original DTDG, then
(u1∗, . . . , uN∗, x1∗, . . . , xN∗) ∈ F ′ is also an open-loop Nash
equilibrium of the DTDG with consistent conjectures.
Proof: Since F = F ′ , an equilibrium of the orig-
inal DTDG is also feasible for the DTDG with consis-
tent conjectures. For player i ∈ N , let (u−i∗, x−i∗) ∈
U−i × X−i be the actions and state conjectures of other
players at the equilibrium of the original game. Since
the set Ω′i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1) has additional constraints than
Ωi(u
−i∗;x1), for all i ∈ N , Ω
′
i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1) ⊆
Ωi(u
−i∗;x1). Hence (u1∗, . . . , uN∗, x1∗, . . . , xN∗) ∈ F ′ is
also an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the DTDG with con-
sistent conjectures.
Thus, an equilibrium of the original game is also an equilib-
rium of the DTDG with consistent conjectures. The reverse
relation will be discussed in Section V-C. Next we show the
shared constraint structure of the mapping Ω′ which is vital
for the existence result.
A. Shared constraint structure of the DTDG with consistent
conjectures
The motive of modifying the game with consistent conjec-
tures is that it gives a shared constraint structure to the game
which can be utilized for deriving an existence result. The
relation of the consistent conjectures and the shared constraint
structure applied to multi-leader multi-follower games is found
in [11]. The set value map Ω′(u, x) is a shared constraint
mapping if there exists a set S such that ∀i ∈ N ,
(ui, xi) ∈ Ω
′
i(u
−i, x−i;x1)⇐⇒ (u, x) ∈ S.
Notice that the set S is independent of i. The concept of
shared constraint structure was studied in 1965 by Rosen [12]
and is used in some recent papers (e.g., [13], [14], [15]).
The following lemma shows that for a DTDG with consistent
conjectures, the set value map Ω′(u, x) has a shared constraint
structure.
Lemma 5.1: Consider a DTDG with consistent conjectures.
Let Ω
′
(u, x) be the Cartesian product of the constraint set of
problem P ′i (u−i, x−i;x1). Then Ω
′
(u, x) is a shared constraint
mapping with shared constraint set given by F ′ ≡ (U×A)∩H,
where
A , {(xi, x−i)|(xi, x−i) ∈ X, xik+1 = x
j
k+1, ∀j ∈ N\{i},
∀k ∈ K},
and H , {(ui, u−i, xi, x−i)|(ui, u−i) ∈ U, (xi, x−i) ∈ X,
xi2 = f1(x1, u
i
1, u
−i
1 ), x
i
k+1 = fk(x
i
k, u
i
k, u
−i
k ), ∀k ∈ K\{1}}.
Proof: Let i ∈ N be an arbitrary player for the game with
consistent conjectures. By using the defined sets A and H, the
set Ω
′
i(u
−i, x−i;x1) can be written as, Ω
′
i(u
−i, x−i;x1) =
{(uˆi, xˆi)|(uˆi, u−i) ∈ U, (xˆi, x−i) ∈ A, (uˆi, u−i, xˆi, x−i) ∈
H}. i.e., (ui, xi) ∈ Ω′i(u−i, x−i;x1)⇐⇒ (u, x) ∈ (U ×A) ∩
H, which is independent of i. Since the implication holds for
each i ∈ N , Ω′(u, x) is a shared constraint mapping with
shared constraint set given by (U × A) ∩ H. It can be seen
from (3) that the shared constraint set is indeed the set of fixed
points of the mapping Ω′ . Hence, F ′ = (U ×A) ∩H.
Thus, we have,
(ui, xi) ∈ Ω
′
i(u
−i, x−i;x1)⇐⇒ (u, x) ∈ F
′
. (4)
Now we use the relation (4) to show the existence of equilibria
for a class of games called the potential DTDGs in the next
section.
B. Existence of equilibria for a potential DTDG with consis-
tent conjectures
Potential games were well studied by many and one pivotal
paper is [9] by Monderer and Shapley. We extend this concept
to DTDGs and term it as potential DTDGs which is defined
as follows.
Definition 5.2: Consider a DTDG in conjecture state formu-
lation as defined in Section III with cost function of players
given by {J1, J2, . . . , JN}. The DTDG is said to be potential
if there exist a potential function π such that for all i ∈ N
and for all u−i ∈ U−i,
J i(u˜i, x˜i, u−i;x1)− J
i(uˆi, xˆi, u−i;x1) = π(u˜
i, x˜i, u−i;x1)−
π(uˆi, xˆi, u−i;x1), ∀(u˜
i, x˜i), (uˆi, xˆi) ∈ U i ×X i.
The advantage of a potential game is that the minimizer of the
potential function [9] over suitably defined feasible set gives
an equilibrium of the game. Conditions for the existence of
open-loop Nash equilibria in a potential DTDGs is given by
considering the following optimisation problem denoted by P .
P min
u,x
π(u, x;x1)
s.t. (u, x) ∈ F
′
.
Note that the objective function of problem P is the potential
function, π which is to be minimized over the shared constraint
set F
′
. The following theorem shows that a minimizer of the
problem P is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the potential
DTDG with consistent conjectures.
Theorem 5.2: Consider a DTDG with consistent conjec-
tures. Let F
′ be the shared constraint set of the DTDG with
consistent conjectures. Suppose the cost function of players
admit a potential function π, then any minimizer of problem
8P is an equilibrium of the potential DTDG with consistent
conjectures.
Proof: Suppose (u∗, x∗) ∈ F ′ is a global minimum of
the problem P . Then,
π(u∗, x∗;x1) ≤ π(u, x;x1), ∀(u, x) ∈ F
′
.
For some i ∈ N , split the argument u = (ui, u−i) ∈ U and
x = (xi, x−i) ∈ X , we can rewrite the above inequality as,
π(u∗, x∗;x1) ≤ π(u
i, u−i, xi, x−i;x1), ∀(u
i, u−i, xi, x−i) ∈ F
′
.
The inequality still holds even if we replace u−i and x−i
by u−i∗ and x−i∗, the actions and state conjectures of other
players at the minimum. That is,
π(u∗, x∗;x1) ≤ π(u
i, u−i∗, xi,x−i∗;x1),
∀(ui, u−i∗, xi, x−i∗) ∈ F
′
.
Since F ′ is a shared constraint mapping of Ω′(u, x), by
Lemma 5.1, (ui, u−i∗, xi, x−i∗) ∈ F ′ =⇒ (ui, xi) ∈
Ω
′
i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1). Hence, we can rewrite the inequality as,
π(u∗, x∗;x1) ≤ π(u
i, u−i∗, xi,x−i∗;x1),
∀(ui, xi) ∈ Ω
′
i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1).
Since π is a potential function of the DTDG, ∀i ∈ N ,
J i(ui∗, xi∗, u−i∗, x−i∗;x1) ≤ J
i(ui, xi, u−i∗, x−i∗;x1),
∀(ui, xi) ∈ Ω
′
i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1).
Hence, (u∗, x∗) ∈ F ′ is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the
potential DTDG with consistent conjectures.
Thus, for a potential DTDG with consistent conjectures, a
minimiser of the problem P is an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Conditions under which an equilibrium exist for a potential
DTDG with consistent conjectures is given in the following
corollaries.
Corollary 5.3: Consider a potential DTDG with consistent
conjectures. Suppose the potential function π is continuous and
the set F ′ is compact, then the game has an equilibrium given
by the minimizer of the problem P . The shared constraint set,
F
′ is compact if the sets U,X are compact and fk, the state
mapping is continuous for all k ∈ K.
Conditions for the existence of an equilibrium without the
compactness of state space and action set is given as follows.
Corollary 5.4: Consider a potential DTDG with consistent
conjectures. Suppose the potential function π is continuous
and coercive and fk is continuous for all k ∈ K, then the
game has an equilibrium.
Thus, for a potential DTDG with consistent conjectures under
these conditions we can guarantee the existence of an open-
loop Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium is given by a
minimizer of problem P .
C. ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original game
We have shown that an equilibrium of the original game
is an equilibrium of the game with consistent conjectures. In
this section, the reverse relation of the equilibrium is being
considered, i.e., an equilibrium of the DTDG with consistent
conjectures is related to ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original
DTDG. The definition of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original
game is given as follows.
Definition 5.3: Consider a DTDG in state conjecture for-
mulation as defined in Section III. For ǫ ≥ 0, a point
{ui∗, xi∗; i ∈ N} ∈ (U × X) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of
the original game if ∀i ∈ N , given u−i∗ ∈ U−i and x1,
J i(ui∗, xi∗;u−i∗, x1) ≤ inf
u˜i,x˜i
J i(u˜i, x˜i;u−i∗, x1) + ǫ,
where the inf is over (u˜i, x˜i) ∈ Ωi(u−i∗;x1).
In this section, we first analyse the case of linear-quadratic
DTDGs with a convex cost functions and then we extend the
analysis for a general class of DTDGs.
1) ǫ-Nash equilibrium for linear-quadratic DTDGs : The
aim of this section is to relate a particular equilibrium of
the linear-quadratic DTDG with consistent conjectures to an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original game. We use a result
on the exact penalty functions from the book [16] to find
the ǫ-Nash equilibrium relation for linear-quadratic DTDGs.
In order to state the result, consider a general optimisation
problem denoted by P with equality constraints.
P min
x∈Rn
f(x)
s.t. hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p,
where f : Rn → R and hi : Rn → Rp, p ≤ n are continuously
differentiable functions. The following proposition provides
the result that we use to derive the ǫ-Nash equilibrium relation.
Proposition 5.5: (Theorem 17.3 in [16]) Suppose x∗ is a
strict local solution of the nonlinear programming problem
P at which the first order KKT conditions are satisfied with
Lagrange multipliers λ∗i , i = 1, . . . , p. Then x∗ is a local
minimizer of φ(x;µ) for all µ > µ∗, where µ∗ = max
i=1,...,p
|λ∗i |
and φ(x;µ) = f(x) + µ
∑
i=1,...,p
|hi(x)|.
It can be easily verified that if the problem P is a convex
optimization problem, then the result in Proposition 5.5 is also
valid for a global solution. Consider a linear-quadratic DTDG
as defined in Definition 4.3 with Qik+1 ≻ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K.
Therefore, a player’s problem in a linear-quadratic DTDG is
a convex optimization problem. Let (u∗, x∗) ∈ U × X be
an equilibrium of the linear-quadratic DTDG with consistent
conjectures that we are interested in. For player i ∈ N , let
(u−i∗, x−i∗) ∈ U−i×X−i be the actions and state conjectures
of other players at the equilibrium of the linear-quadratic
DTDG with consistent conjectures. Given (u−i∗, x−i∗), the
player i’s problem in a linear-quadratic DTDG with consistent
conjectures is given by the following problem which is denoted
by Li(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1).
min
ui,xi
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
xi
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i
k+1 + u
i′
kR
ii
k u
i
k +
∑
j∈N\{i}
u
j∗
′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k
)
s.t. (ui, xi) ∈ Ω
′
i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1),
9where, in this case,
Ω
′
i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1) = {u
i
1, . . . , u
i
K , x
i
2, . . . , x
i
K+1|u
i
k ∈ U
i
k,
∀k ∈ K, xik+1 ∈ X
i
k+1, ∀k ∈ K, x
i
k+1 = Akx
i
k + b
i
ku
i
k+∑
j∈N\{i}
b
j
ku
j∗
k , ∀k ∈ K, x
i
k+1 = x
j∗
k+1, ∀j ∈ N\{i}, ∀k ∈ K}.
Here also ui = (ui1, . . . , uiK) and xi = (xi2, . . . , xiK+1).
Consider the player i’s problem with an exact penalty function
for the consistent state conjecture constraint with penalty
parameter µi. Let us denote this problem by L˜i(u−i∗, x−i∗;µi)
and is given by the following problem.
min
ui,xi
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
xi
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i
k+1 + u
i′
kR
ii
k u
i
k+
∑
j∈N\{i}
u
j∗
′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k + µ
i
∑
j∈N\{i}
|xik+1 − x
j∗
k+1|
)
s.t. (ui, xi) ∈ Ωi(u−i∗;x1), where,
Ωi(u
−i∗;x1) = {u
i
1, . . . , u
i
K , x
i
2, . . . , x
i
K+1|u
i
k ∈ U
i
k,
∀k ∈ K, xik+1 ∈ X
i
k+1, ∀k ∈ K,
xik+1 = Akx
i
k + b
i
ku
i
k +
∑
j∈N\{i}
b
j
ku
j∗
k , ∀k ∈ K}.
Thus, we have two problems to represent the player i’s prob-
lem in a linear-quadratic DTDG with consistent conjectures.
One is Li(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1) with the consistent conjecture con-
dition in the constraint set and another is L˜i(u−i∗, x−i∗;µi)
with exact penalty function for the consistent conjecture
condition. Though the problems are different, the equivalence
of equilibria of games having these problems can be derived
directly from Proposition 5.5 and is stated as follows.
Proposition 5.6: Consider a linear-quadratic DTDG with
consistent conjectures with Qik+1 ≻ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K.
Suppose (u∗, x∗) ∈ F ′ is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of
the game. For i ∈ N , let (u−i∗, x−i∗) ∈ U−i×X−i be the ac-
tions and state conjectures of other players at this equilibrium.
Let the player i’s problem in a linear-quadratic DTDG with
consistent conjecture be given by Li(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1). Suppose
the Lagrange multipliers at the equilibrium of the game
corresponding to the consistent state conjecture constraints are
given by λij∗k+1, ∀j ∈ N\{i}, ∀k ∈ K. Then (u∗, x∗) is also
an equilibrium of the game with the player i’s problem given
by L˜i(u−i∗, x−i∗;µi) for all µi > µi∗, where,
µi∗ = max
k∈K
max
j∈N\{i}
|λij∗k+1|. (5)
Proof: Since Qik+1 ≻ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K, the problem
Li(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1) is a convex optimisation problem which
has a global solution. By Proposition 5.5, the result follows.
We now use Proposition 5.6 to derive the result which relates
the equilibrium of a linear-quadratic DTDG with consistent
conjectures to ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original linear-
quadratic DTDG. Let (u∗, x∗) ∈ F ′ be an equilibrium of the
linear-quadratic DTDG with consistent conjectures. Suppose
player i ∈ N plays the best response in the original game
to (u−i∗, x−i∗). Then in that case let us denote xik+1, k ∈ K
as the best response state trajectory conjectured by player i
in the original game. The relation of (u∗, x∗) to the ǫ-Nash
equilibrium of the original game is stated as follows.
Theorem 5.7: Consider a linear-quadratic DTDG with con-
sistent conjectures with Qik+1 ≻ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈ K. Suppose
(u∗, x∗) ∈ F
′ is an equilibrium of this game. For player
i ∈ N , let xj∗k+1 ∈ X
j
k+1, k ∈ K be the state conjecture
of player j ∈ N\{i} at the equilibrium of this game. Let
λ
ij∗
k+1, ∀j ∈ N\{i}, ∀k ∈ K be as in Proposition 5.6. Let
x
i
k+1, k ∈ K be the player i’s best response state conjecture
in the original game corresponding to u−i∗ ∈ U−i. Then
(u∗, x∗) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original game with
ǫ = max
i∈N
{ǫi}, where ǫi satisfy
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N\{i}
µi|xik+1−x
j∗
k+1| ≤
2ǫi and µi > µi∗, where µi∗ is given by (5).
Proof: Suppose {(xi∗, ui∗), i ∈ N} is an open-loop Nash
equilibrium of the linear-quadratic DTDG with consistent
conjectures. That is for all i ∈ N and for each µi > µi∗,
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
xi∗
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i∗′
k+1 +
∑
j∈N
u
j∗′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k
)
≤
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
xi
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i
k+1 + u
i′
kR
ii
k u
i
k +
∑
j∈N\{i}
u
j∗′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k +
∑
j∈N\{i}
µi|xik+1 − x
j∗
k+1|
)
, ∀(ui, xi) ∈ Ωi(u
−i∗;x1).
Let (ui1, . . . ,uiK ,xi2, . . . ,xiK+1) ∈ Ωi(u−i∗;x1) be the best
response of the original linear-quadratic DTDG corresponding
to u−i∗, the actions of other players at the equilibrium of the
game with consistent conjectures. Hence,
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
xi∗
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i∗′
k+1 +
∑
j∈N
u
j∗′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k
)
≤
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
x
i′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i
k+1 + u
i′
kR
ii
k u
i
k +
∑
j∈N\{i}
u
j∗′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k +
∑
j∈N\{i}
µi|xik+1 − x
j∗
k+1|
)
.
By rearranging, the above inequality can be written as,
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
xi∗
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i∗′
k+1 +
∑
j∈N
u
j∗′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k
)
≤
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
x
i′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i
k+1 + u
i′
kR
ii
k u
i
k +
∑
j∈N\{i}
u
j∗′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k
)
+
1
2
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N\{i}
µi|xik+1 − x
j∗
k+1|.
Since
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N\{i}
µi|xik+1 − x
j∗
k+1| ≤ 2ǫi, ∀i ∈ N and
(ui1, . . . ,u
i
K ,x
i
2, . . . ,x
i
K+1) is the best response of the origi-
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nal game,
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
xi∗
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i∗′
k+1 +
∑
j∈N
u
j∗′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k
)
≤
inf
(ui,xi)∈Ωi(u−i∗;x1)
∑
k∈K
1
2
(
xi
′
k+1Q
i
k+1x
i
k+1 + u
i′
kR
ii
k u
i
k
+
∑
j∈N\{i}
u
j∗′
k R
ij
k u
j∗
k
)
+ ǫi
Hence, {(xi∗, ui∗); i ∈ N} is an ǫ- Nash equilibrium of linear-
quadratic DTDG with ǫ = max{ǫi, i ∈ N}.
Thus, under conditions specified in Theorem 5.7, an equilib-
rium of a linear-quadratic DTDG with consistent conjectures is
an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original linear-quadratic DTDG
for a certain ǫ. Note that the convexity of the cost function
and constraint set is only used in Theorem 5.7. Hence the
result can be extended to any convex problems, not limited to
linear-quadratic games. However, for a general case convexity
need not hold. Therefore the next section provides an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium relation for a general case, but with additional
assumptions.
2) ǫ-Nash equilibrium for general DTDGs: For a general
class of games, we use a result on the exact penalty functions
from the paper [17] by Di Pillo and Grippo for deriving
the relation of an equilibrium of the game with consistent
conjectures to the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original game.
The Mangasarian-Fromowitz constraint qualification (MFCQ)
(See Definition 5.5) needs to be satisfied for the result to
hold. For that, we consider an equivalent game having a minor
modification from the DTDG with consistent conjectures and
we will refer to it as alternate consistent conjecture DTDG. In
this alternate consistent conjecture DTDG we define an exact
penalty function game having an exact penalty function for the
consistent conjecture condition. We derive the relation of these
two games, the alternate consistent conjecture DTDG and the
exact penalty function game using the result from [17]. The
ǫ-Nash equilibrium condition is provided utilising the relation
of the exact penalty function game in turn to the DTDG with
consistent conjectures.
In order to make the explanation clear, let us denote the
original game, the DTDG with consistent conjectures and the
alternate consistent conjecture DTDG by Go, Gc and Ga respec-
tively. The difference of Ga, the alternate consistent conjecture
DTDG and Gc, the DTDG with consistent conjecture is that
a player’s state conjecture is constrained to be consistent with
the state conjecture of one other player in the game (in this
case, the next labelled player), not all players as in Gc.
Let i ∈ N be a player in a DTDG. Given u−i ∈ U−i, x−i ∈
X−i and x1, the player i’s problem in Ga is denoted by
P¯i(u−i, x−i;x1) and is given by the following.
P¯i(u−i, x−i;x1) min
ui,xi
J i(ui, xi;u−i, x1)
s.t. (ui, xi) ∈ Ω¯i(u−i, x−i;x1),
where,
Ω¯i(u
−i, x−i;x1) = {uˆ
i
1, . . . , uˆ
i
K , xˆ
i
2, . . . , xˆ
i
K+1|uˆ
i
k ∈ U
i
k,
∀k ∈ K, xˆik+1 ∈ X
i
k+1, ∀k ∈ K, xˆ
i
2 = f1(x1, uˆ
i
1, u
−i
1 ),
xˆik+1 = fk(xˆ
i
k, uˆ
i
k, u
−i
k ), ∀k ∈ K\{1}, xˆ
i
k+1 = x
j(i)
k+1, ∀k ∈ K},
where the next labelled player j(i) ∈ N is given by
j(i) =
{
i+ 1, i ∈ N\{N}
1, i = N.
(6)
Using the player i’s problem given by P¯i(u−i, x−i;x1), the
open-loop Nash equilibrium in Ga can be defined as follows.
Definition 5.4: An N -tuple of strategies {(ui∗, xi∗) ∈ U i×
X i; i ∈ N} is said to be an open-loop Nash equilibrium of
Ga if ∀i ∈ N , given (u−i∗, x−i∗) ∈ U−i ×X−i, the actions
and state conjectures of other players at equilibrium of Ga,
J i(ui∗, xi∗;u−i∗, x1) ≤ J
i(u˜i, x˜i;u−i∗, x1),
∀(u˜i, x˜i) ∈ Ω¯i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1).
The equivalence of Gc and Ga in terms of the equilibrium set
is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.8: Consider a DTDG in state conjecture for-
mulation. Suppose {(ui∗, xi∗) ∈ U i × X i; i ∈ N} is an
open-loop Nash equilibrium of Gc, the DTDG with consistent
conjectures, then {(ui∗, xi∗) ∈ U i × X i; i ∈ N} is also an
equilibrium of Ga, alternate consistent conjecture DTDG and
vice versa.
Proof: “ ⇒ ” Let {(ui∗, xi∗) ∈ U i × X i; i ∈ N} be
an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Gc. Then from Definition
5.1, at an equilibrium {(ui∗, xi∗), i ∈ N} of Gc, since
all players conjectures consistently, the consistency condi-
tion with N − 1 players in the set Ω′i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1) can
be replaced with a single player condition. Hence, at the
equilibrium {(ui∗, xi∗), i ∈ N} of Gc, Ω
′
i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1) =
Ω¯i(u
−i∗, x−i∗;x1). Thus, {(ui∗, xi∗), i ∈ N} is also an
equilibrium of Ga.
“ ⇐ ” Suppose {(ui⋄, xi⋄) ∈ U i × X i; i ∈ N} is an
equilibrium of Ga. Then from Definition 5.4, at an equilib-
rium {(ui⋄, xi⋄); i ∈ N} of Ga, for all i ∈ N , xi⋄k+1 =
x
j⋄
k+1, ∀j ∈ N\{i}, ∀k ∈ K. Hence, at the equilibrium
{(ui⋄, xi⋄), i ∈ N} of Ga, the consistent condition with the
adjacent player in Ω¯i(u−i⋄, x−i⋄;x1) can be replaced with
the consistent condition for all rivals. i.e. at the equilibrium
{(ui⋄, xi⋄); i ∈ N}, Ω¯i(u−i⋄, x−i⋄;x1) = Ω′i(u
−i⋄, x−i⋄;x1)
and hence {(ui⋄, xi⋄), i ∈ N} is also an equilibrium of Gc.
Thus, by Proposition 5.8, the set of equilibria of both
games, Gc and Ga are equivalent. Now consider a particular
equilibrium {(ui∗, xi∗), i ∈ N} of Gc. Our aim is to relate
this equilibrium to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Go, the original
game. Let (u−i∗, x−i∗) ∈ U−i×X−i be the actions and state
conjectures of the rivals of player i ∈ N at the equilibrium
of Gc. Given u−i∗, the best response set of player i in Go is
denoted by Ri(u−i∗) and is given by the following.
Ri(u
−i∗) = {(ui, xi)|
(ui, xi) ∈ arg min
(uˆi,xˆi)∈Ωi(u−i∗;x1)
J i(uˆi, xˆi;u−i∗, x1)}.
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Let R¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗) denote the best response of player i
in Ga corresponding to (u−i∗, x−i∗) which is given by the
following.
R¯i(u
−i∗, x−i∗) = {(ui, xi)|
(ui, xi) ∈ arg min
(uˆi,xˆi)∈Ω¯i(u−i∗,x−i∗;x1)
J i(uˆi, xˆi;u−i∗, x1)}.
In order to make the structure of the problem same as
the one used by Di Pillo and Grippo in [17], we assume
Ri(u
−i∗) is bounded and we introduce a compact set Di =
Di(u−i∗), i ∈ N (with non-empty interior) such that the best
response set Ri(u−i∗) ⊂ D˚i. The following proposition shows
that the best response set of alternate consistent conjecture
DTDG R¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗) is also contained in the compact set
D˚i.
Proposition 5.9: Consider an equilibrium {(ui∗, xi∗) ∈
U i×X i; i ∈ N} of Gc, the DTDG with consistent conjectures.
Let (u−i∗, x−i∗) ∈ U−i × X−i be the actions and state
conjectures of rivals of player i at the equilibrium of Gc.
Let Ri(u−i∗) and R¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗) denote the set of best
responses of player i in the original game Go and the alternate
consistent conjecture game Ga respectively corresponding to
(u−i∗, x−i∗). If the best response set Ri(u−i∗) is contained in
the compact set Di, then the best response set R¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗)
is also contained in Di.
Proof: Since there is one additional constraint of consis-
tency of conjectured state in a player’s problem in Ga than
in Go, Ω¯
′
i ⊆ Ωi and hence R¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗) ⊆ Ri(u−i∗).
Therefore, R¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗) is contained in D˚i.
Let (u∗, x∗) be an equilibrium of Ga. Given (u−i∗, x−i∗) ∈
U−i ×X−i, consider a game with the following problem for
player i denoted by P˜i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1).
P˜i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1) min
ui,xi
J i(ui, xi;u−i∗, x1)
s.t. (ui, xi) ∈ Ω¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1) ∩ D˚i.
Note that the feasible set in this game is an intersection of
the interior of the compact set Di and the feasible set of
P¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1). Since D˚i contains the best response of
player i in Ga, the solution of problem P¯i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1) is
also a solution of P˜i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1). Therefore, an equilib-
rium of Ga is also an equilibrium of the game with player
i’s problem given by P˜i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1). Now consider the
player i’s problem given by P˜i(u−i∗, x−i∗;x1) with an exact
penalty function for the consistent state conjecture constraint
with penalty parameter µi. Let us denote this problem by
Qi(u
−i∗, x−i∗;µi) which is given by the following.
min
ui,xi
J i(ui, xi;u−i∗, x1) + µi|xi − xj(i)∗|
s.t. (ui, xi) ∈ Ωi(u−i∗;x1) ∩ D˚i,
where µi > 0 is the penalty parameter and xj(i)∗ ∈ Xj(i)
is the state conjecture of the next labelled player at the
equilibrium of Gc, where j(i) given by (6). We will refer to
the game with player i’s problem given by Qi(u−i∗, x−i∗;µi)
as exact penalty function game. The relation of equilibria of
Ga and exact penalty function game can be deduced directly
from a result in the paper [17] which is given in Proposition
5.10. For the result to hold, the Mangasarian-Fromowitz
constraint qualification (MFCQ) is required to satisfy. For
defining MFCQ, consider the equality constrained optimisation
problem given by P.
Definition 5.5: The MFCQ holds at x ∈ Rn for problem
P if ∇hj(x), j = 1, . . . , p are linearly independent and there
exist a z ∈ Rn such that ∇hj(x)′z = 0, j = 1, . . . , p.
By the theorem of alternatives, the MFCQ can be restated as
follows. The MFCQ holds at x ∈ Rn if there exist no vj , j =
1, . . . , p such that
p∑
j=1
vj∇hj(x) = 0, (vj , j = 1, . . . , p) 6= 0.
Note that MFCQ is satisfied at the equilibrium of Ga since the
gradients of the consistency constraints at equilibrium of Ga
are linearly independent. In the following proposition we state
the result which is derived from [17].
Proposition 5.10: (Theorem 4 in [17]) Let (u∗, x∗) ∈ F ′
be an equilibrium of Ga. Assume Mangasarian-Fromowitz
constraint qualification (MFCQ) is satisfied at (u∗, x∗) and
suppose Ri(u−i∗) ⊂ D˚i. Then there exist a µ∗i , i ∈ N such
that for all µi ∈ [µ∗i ,∞), (u∗, x∗) is an equilibrium of the
exact penalty function game.
It can be seen that though in the paper by Di Pillo and
Grippo, all the equality constraints are penalized, the result still
holds even if we penalize a subset of the equality constraints
as in our case. Let (u∗, x∗) ∈ F ′ be an equilibrium of
DTDG with consistent conjectures. Suppose for (u−i∗, x−i∗),
the player i plays the best response in the original game. In
that case as we have done in the linear-quadratic case, let us
denote xi as the best response state trajectory conjectured by
player i in the original game. The relation of an equilibrium
in Gc to the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Go is stated as follows.
Theorem 5.11: Consider a DTDG with consistent conjec-
tures given by Gc. Suppose (u∗, x∗) ∈ F
′ is an equilibrium of
Gc. Suppose xj(i)∗ ∈ Xj(i) is the state trajectory conjectured
by player j(i) ∈ N at the equilibrium of Gc, where j(i) is
given by (6). Suppose that Ri(u−i∗) ⊂ D˚i, for all i ∈ N .
Let (ui,xi) ∈ Ri(u−i∗) be a best response state trajectory
conjectured by player i in Go corresponding to (u−i∗, x−i∗).
Then (u∗, x∗) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original game
with ǫ = max
i∈N
{ǫi}, where ǫi satisfy µi|xi − xj(i)∗| ≤ ǫi and
µi ∈ [µ∗i ,∞), where µ∗i given by Proposition 5.10.
Proof: Suppose {(ui∗, xi∗), i ∈ N} ∈ F ′ is an open-
loop Nash equilibrium of Gc. Since the equilibrium set of
Gc is equivalent to Ga, {(ui∗, xi∗) ∈ U i × X i, i ∈ N} is
also an equilibrium of Ga. Since MFCQ is satisfied at an
equilibrium of Ga, by Proposition 5.10, the equilibrium set
of Ga is equivalent to that of the exact penalty function game
for all µi ∈ [µ∗i ,∞). Hence, for all i ∈ N and for some
µi ∈ [µ∗i ,∞),
J i(ui∗, xi∗;u−i∗, x1) ≤
[
J i(ui, xi;u−i∗, x1)+
µi|x
i − xj(i)∗|
]
, ∀(ui, xi) ∈ Ωi(u
−i∗;x1) ∩ D˚i.
Let (ui,xi) ∈ Ωi(u−i∗;x1) be a best response of player
i in Go corresponding to the equilibrium actions u−i∗ of Gc.
Since the best response set Ri(u−i∗) ⊂ D˚i, we can write
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(ui,xi) ∈ D˚i. Since (ui,xi) ∈ Ωi(u−i∗;x1) ∩ D˚i,
J i(ui∗, xi∗;u−i∗, x1) ≤ J
i(ui,xi;u−i∗, x1) + µi|x
i − xj(i)∗|.
Since (ui,xi) is a best response of the original game,
J i(ui∗, xi∗;u−i∗, x1) ≤
inf
(ui,xi)∈Ωi(u−i∗;x1)
[
J i(ui, xi;u−i∗, x1)
]
+µi|x
i − xj(i)∗|.
Since µi|xi−xj(i)∗| ≤ ǫi, ∀i ∈ N and ǫ = max{ǫi; i ∈ N},
J i(ui∗, xi∗;u−i∗, x1) ≤ inf
(ui,xi)
[
J i(ui, xi;u−i∗, x1)
]
+ ǫi,
where the inf is over (ui, xi) ∈ Ωi(u−i∗;x1). That is
(ui∗, xi∗; i ∈ N ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original
game.
This result gives conditions for an equilibrium of the game
with consistent conjectures to be an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the
original game. A significant factor which determines the ǫ-
Nash equilibrium relation is the deviation of state conjectures
at the equilibrium of Gc to the best response state conjecture
of a player in Go corresponding to the state conjectures at the
equilibrium of Gc.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper provides new results regarding the existence of
open-loop Nash equilibria in DTDGs. A new approach for
analysis of DTDGs using the state conjecture formulation is
the pivotal step which leads to the new results. Using this
formulation, a solution of an optimisation problem is related
to an equilibrium for a certain class of DTDGs. The first result
that we provide is for a class of games called quasi-potential
DTDGs. Many games including linear-quadratic DTDGs under
certain conditions comes under the class of quasi-potential
DTDGs. Further, we modify the DTDG with an additional
constraint of consistency of the conjectured states for which
the game has a shared constraint structure. Although the
game is different from the original game, an equilibrium
of the original game is also an equilibrium of the DTDG
with consistent conjectures. Utilising the shared constraint
structure, conditions for the existence of equilibria for a class
of games called potential DTDGs are provided in this modified
game with consistent conjectures. A detailed section on the ǫ-
Nash equilibrium gives a relation of an equilibrium of the
DTDG with consistent conjectures to the original game.
REFERENCES
[1] T. Bas¸ar and G. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. Clas-
sics in Applied Mathematics, SIAM, Philadelphia, 1999.
[2] A. Kannan and V. M. Zavala, “A game-theoretical model predictive
control framework for electricity markets,” in 49th Annual Allerton
Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing. IEEE, 2011,
pp. 1280–1285.
[3] N. Van Long, A survey of dynamic games in economics. World
Scientific, 2010.
[4] S. Bylka, S. Ambroszkiewicz, and J. Komar, “Discrete time dynamic
game model for price competition in an oligopoly,” Annals of Operations
Research, vol. 97, no. 1-4, pp. 69–89, 2000.
[5] J. Engwerda, LQ dynamic optimization and differential games. John
Wiley & Sons, 2005.
[6] G. Jank and H. Abou-Kandil, “Existence and uniqueness of open-
loop Nash equilibria in linear-quadratic discrete time games,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 267–271, 2003.
[7] P. Reddy, V and G. Zaccour, “Open loop Nash equilibria in a class of
linear quadratic difference games with constraints,” IEEE Transactions
on Automatic Control, vol. PP, no. 99, 2015.
[8] A. Jean-Marie and M. Tidball, “Consistent conjectures, equilibria and
dynamic games,” Dynamic games: theory and applications, pp. 93–109,
2005.
[9] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, “Potential games,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 124–143, May 1996.
[10] A. A. Kulkarni and U. V. Shanbhag, “An existence result for hierarchical
Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control (available online), 2015.
[11] ——, “On the consistency of leaders’ conjectures in hierarchical games,”
2013 IEEE 52nd Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC),
pp. 1180–1185, Dec 2013.
[12] J. B. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for
concave N -person games,” Econometrica, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 520–534,
Jul. 1965. [Online]. Available: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911749
[13] A. A. Kulkarni and U. V. Shanbhag, “On the variational equilibrium as
a refinement of the generalized Nash equilibrium,” Automatica, vol. 48,
no. 1, pp. 45–55, 2012.
[14] F. Facchinei, A. Fischer, and V. Piccialli, “On generalized Nash games
and variational inequalities,” Operations Research Letters, vol. 35, no. 2,
pp. 159–164, Mar. 2007.
[15] A. A. Kulkarni and U. V. Shanbhag, “Revisiting generalized Nash
games and variational inequalities,” Journal of Optimization Theory and
Applications, vol. 154, no. 1, pp. 1–12, 2012.
[16] J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright, Numerical Optimization, ser. Springer Series
in Operations Research. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[17] G. Di Pillo and L. Grippo, “Exact penalty functions in constrained
optimization,” SIAM Journal on control and optimization, vol. 27, no. 6,
pp. 1333–1360, 1989.
